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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Following remand, Keith A. Brown appeals from the district court’s order denying 
his motion to suppress incriminating statements about an Idaho homicide, made to a 
detective when Brown was in custody in Florida.     
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The facts underlying Brown’s convictions and the proceedings through his initial 
appeal were described by the district court as follows: 
 The facts surrounding this case are set forth in State v. Brown, 155 
Idaho 423, 313 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2013) review denied (Dec. 9, 2013).  In 
that decision the Court of Appeals affirmed on all issues except the motion 
to suppress.  The issue originally presented to this court was whether 
Brown was mentally capable of voluntarily confessing.  However, as noted 
by the appellate court, Brown abandoned that issue on appeal and instead 
now argues that his suppression motion should have been granted 
because the State presented no evidence whatsoever to meet its burden 
of proving that his statements were voluntary.  Id.  155 Idaho at 431, 313 
P.3d at 759.  The case was remanded for a new hearing on the 
voluntariness or involuntariness of Brown’s statements to Lieutenant Long.   
 
 Brown was originally charged with the murder of Les Breaw; 
however, pursuant to a plea agreement he pled guilty to voluntary 
manslaughter reserving his right to appeal the pretrial motions, including 
the motion to suppress.  The Court of Appeals summarized the facts 
surrounding Brown’s confession as follows: 
 
On March 20, the day after the body was found, Brown was 
arrested in Florida on a fugitive warrant from Idaho.  Before 
he was extradited to Idaho on the grand theft charge, Brown 
and Tyrah [Brown’s wife] were interviewed by Florida law 
enforcement officials.  In these interviews, the Browns made 
a number of incriminating statements.  When asked about 
Breaw’s $50,000 escrow check, Brown claimed that the 
money was owed to him because of services he had 
rendered Breaw, but eventually Tyrah confessed to forging 




to shooting Breaw and hiding his body.  According to Tyrah, 
she had done it because Breaw had raped her.  When 
Brown was told that his wife had confessed, he also 
confessed to killing Breaw and told officers that Tyrah was 
not there.[1]  According to Brown, he and Breaw had gone 
shooting that day, and during the outing Breaw offered 
Brown the escrow check so that Brown would forgive Breaw 
for Breaw’s sexual misconduct with Tyrah.  Breaw continued, 
however, to make disparaging remarks about Tyrah, which 
ultimately prompted Brown to shoot Breaw.  Brown said that 
he buried Breaw in the snow and hid the murder weapon 
nearby.  Brown even drew a map to the gun’s location to 
persuade officers that Tyrah was not involved.  By the next 
day, however, Brown’s story had changed.  He recanted his 
story about killing Breaw and instead told the Florida officers 
that shooting Breaw had been an accident. 
 
 Id., 155 Idaho at 427-28, 313 P.3d at 755-56. 
 
(R., pp.132-133 (explanation added).) 
 On remand, a second suppression motion hearing was held in which, according 
to the district court, Brown contended “the police threatened to arrest his wife if he did 
not confess, thus rendering his confession involuntary.”  (R., p.134.)  Following the 
hearing, the district court concluded, “the State has carried its burden of proof 
establishing that the statements made by Brown were voluntary[,]” and denied Brown’s 
motion to suppress.  (R., pp.135-136.)  Brown filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., 
pp.137-141, 145-148.) 
 
                                                          
1  Detective Long testified at the October 7, 2014 hearing on Brown’s suppression 
motion that he told Brown during the March 22, 2007 interview that Tyrah said that she 
had killed Mr. Breaw.   (10/7/14 Tr., p.46, Ls.16-23; p.53, Ls.7-13; p.54, Ls.10-13; p.55, 
Ls.13-15.)  However, as will be discussed more fully, see Argument, § C, pp.13-16 and 
n. 4, infra, a review of the March 22nd videotaped interview (St. Ex. 2) reveals that 
Detective Long did not inform Brown that Tyrah confessed to being solely responsible 






Brown states the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.) 
 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Brown failed to show error in the district court’s determination that his 








Brown Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Determination That His 




 Upon remand, the district court held a hearing on Brown’s motion to suppress to 
determine whether his confession was voluntary.  After concluding that the general 
circumstances weighed in favor of a finding of “voluntariness,” the court focused on 
Brown’s primary assertion that his confession was coerced because “the police 
threatened to arrest his wife if he did not confess, thus rendering his confession 
involuntary.”  (R., p.134.)  After the hearing, the court held that, because Brown’s wife 
(Tyrah) was arrested and prosecuted for a period of time for the first degree murder of 
Leslie Breaw following Detective Long’s March 22, 2007 interview with Brown, under 
State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (Ct. App. 2001), any threats (implied or 
express) by the detective to arrest Tyrah were valid and did not render Brown’s 
confession involuntary.  (R., p.135.)  
 On appeal, Brown argues “that his confession was the product of psychological 
coercion by Detective Long, who manipulated Mr. Brown’s immense concern for his wife 
and any adverse consequences to her due to her confession to the same crime.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.8 (emphasis added).)  Brown further argues that “Detective Long’s 
implied threats of prosecution or harm to Tyrah were unjustified” and his “implied threats 
of consequences to Tyrah were unfounded and unsupported at the time.”  (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.14.)  Brown’s argument fails regardless of whether Detective Long threatened in 




B. Standard of Review 
 
 The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 
496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).  Thus, where an appellant claims his statements 
were involuntary, this Court gives “deference to the lower court’s findings of fact, if they 
are not clearly erroneous,” but engages in “free review over the question of whether the 
facts found are constitutionally sufficient to show voluntariness.”  State v. Wilson, 126 
Idaho 926, 928, 894 P.2d 159, 161 (Ct. App. 1995).  The “ultimate determination of 
voluntariness” is a legal question freely reviewed.  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 
287 (1991).  
 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Brown’s Statements Were Voluntary 
 
“[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession 
is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”  Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).  “Indeed, coercive 
government misconduct was the catalyst for th[e] [Supreme] Court’s seminal confession 
case,” Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), and “the cases considered by th[e] 
Court” post-Brown “have focused upon the crucial element of police overreaching.”  
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163.  “While each confession case has turned on its own set of 
factors justifying the conclusion that police conduct was oppressive, all have contained 




conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that 
any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.”  Id.; see also 
State v. Valero, 153 Idaho 910, 912, 285 P.3d 1014, 1016 (Ct. App. 2012) (“In order to 
find a violation of a defendant’s due process rights by virtue of an involuntary 
confession, coercive police conduct is necessary.”).     
“The proper inquiry is to look to the totality of the circumstances and then ask 
whether the defendant’s will was overborne by the police conduct.”  State v. Stone, 154 
Idaho 949, 953, 303 P.3d 636, 640 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 287; 
State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214, 858 P.2d 750, 753 (1993)).  Relevant factors to 
consider in determining whether a defendant’s statements are voluntary include whether 
Miranda warnings were given, the defendant’s age, education, and intelligence, the 
length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use 
of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.  Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (internal citations omitted); Stone, 154 Idaho at 
953, 303 P.3d at 640 (Idaho Court of Appeals utilizing the Bustamonte factors).  
Importantly, the absence or presence of any one factor is not determinative.  Id.   
In this case, the district court denied Brown’s motion to suppress, concluding the 
confession he made during his March 22, 2007 interview by Detective Long was 
voluntary, not coerced.  (R., pp.131-136.)  After quoting the Court of Appeals’ rendition 
of the relevant legal standards, including the Bustamonte factors (R., p.133 (but omitting 
citation to Bustamonte)), the district court explained that the general circumstances of 




 In this case Miranda [sic] warnings were given, and Brown was not 
deprived of food or sleep.[2]  The interrogation by Lieutenant Long was 
thorough, but it was not unduly long.  Long’s approach was low key and 
made without threats.  Brown appears to be of average intelligence and 
according to statements made to the police has operated a successful 
paralegal business.  Dr. Haugen testified that at the time of his 
examination in 2008, Brown was of average intelligence, suffered from 
depression, amphetamine dependency, had an anti-social personality, 
was manipulative, was protective of others to get power and control, and 
significantly, for purposes of this motion, was resistant to being 
manipulated by others.  These circumstances weigh in favor of the 
voluntariness of the statements. 
 
(R., p.134; see also 10/7/14 Tr., p.73, L.3 – p.74, L.25 (Dr. Haugen’s testimony).)    
None of the district court’s general findings about Detective Long’s March 22, 2007 
interview of Brown are challenged on appeal, and a review of that videotaped interview 
(approximately 90 minutes) supports the court’s factual findings regarding the offer of 
food and drink, Miranda warnings, the length of the interview, and the detective’s low-
key and non-threatening demeanor.  (See generally Appellant’s Brief; St. Ex. 2.)    
 The district court next considered the “primary issue presented by Brown[,]” that 
his confession was coerced because “the police threatened to arrest his wife if he did 
not confess, thus rendering his confession involuntary.”  (R., p.134.)  The court opined: 
In State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (Ct. App. 2001) the 
court set forth the law in this situation: 
 
The second component of the interrogation that Schumacher 
characterizes as coercive is Agent Richard’s statement that 
Schumacher’s wife would be arrested if police found 
evidence of her complicity and the agent’s reference to 
Schumacher’s children.  Again, we find Schumacher’s 
argument unpersuasive.  It is true that threats to prosecute a 
defendant’s loved one when there is no legitimate basis to 
do so may be coercive and can render a confession 
                                                          
2  In a footnote, the district court explained, “[i]t was apparently chilly in the interrogation 




involuntary.  In State v. Davis, 115 Idaho 462, 464-65, 767 
P.2d 837, 839-40 (Ct. App. 1989), for example, we held that 
a confession was involuntary where a prosecutor had told 
the defendant that his mother was being held due to the 
defendant’s refusal to confess and where the charges 
against the mother were later dismissed for lack of evidence.  
However, a suspect’s confession is not involuntary merely 
because it was motivated by the desire to prevent a good 
faith arrest of a loved one. 
 
Id., 136 Idaho at 517, 37 P.3d at 14 (citations omitted). 
 
 Here, Tyrah had already confessed to killing Braew [sic].  The 
threat, express or implied, that she would be arrested was legitimate and 
was in good faith.  She was arrested and prosecuted.  Even if Brown’s 
confession was motivated by a desire to protect his wife, the confession is 
not involuntary. 
 
 Brown raises a related issue that Lieutenant Long made an  implicit 
promise of leniency by telling him that he stepped up and did the right 
thing by killing Braew [sic]. This attribution to Long is misleading and 
incomplete.  He stated that Brown had done the right thing “in your eyes.”  
There is nothing in the statement that could be construed as a promise of 
leniency.  Moreover, if there was some belief on the part of Brown that a 
promise had been made, he eventually received a benefit since the 
charges were reduced to manslaughter. 
 
(R., pp.134-135 (footnote omitted).) 
 
The district court’s analysis is correct.  In State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 
37 P.3d 6 (Ct. App. 2001), the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a situation where an 
officer threatened to arrest Schumacher’s wife, if officers discovered evidence to justify 
such an arrest, unless Schumacher confessed to cultivating marijuana.  Id. at 517, 37 
P.3d at 14.  The court explained that “[i]t is true that threats to prosecute a defendant’s 
loved one when there is no legitimate basis to do so may be coercive and can render a 
confession involuntary,” but that the threat to Schumacher was “not unjustified.”  Id.  




discovered evidence “linking Schumacher’s wife to the marijuana cultivation,” then 
“[s]uch evidence, if found, would have justified her arrest.”  Id.  Similarly, in Brown’s 
case, any suggestion by Detective Long that Tyrah would be arrested or prosecuted for 
killing Mr. Breaw would have been valid because that is exactly what happened.  
  On March 20, 2007, Brown and his wife, Tyrah, were arrested in Florida on 
warrants from Idaho for grand theft (Brown) and Montana (Tyrah), and they remained in 
custody throughout their interviews with Detective Long over the next two days.  (St. Ex. 
1, 1:00-1:30; Def. Ex. A, 2:55-2:56; 10/7/14 Tr., p.56, Ls.1-13; p.60, Ls.1-5); see State v. 
Brown, 155 Idaho 423, 427, 313 P.3d 751, 755 (Ct. App. 2013).  At the time of Brown’s 
March 22, 2007 interview by Detective Long, Tyrah was already in jail, having been 
arrested on a Montana warrant; therefore, a threat to arrest her, by itself, would have 
been insignificant.  More importantly, on May 22, 2007, Tyrah was charged with first 
degree murder (presumably of Mr. Breaw) in Bonner County, Idaho.  See Idaho Data 
Repository, State of Idaho vs. Tyrah Brea Harding,3 Bonner County District Court Case 
No. CR-2007-0002885 (attached as Appendix A).  The public record shows that Tyrah’s 
first degree murder charge remained intact until January 9, 2009 -- well after she was 
bound over to district court following a preliminary hearing -- when the state filed an 
Amended Information charging her (only) with two less severe offenses to which she 
pled guilty pursuant to a Rule 11 conditional plea agreement:  accessory to felony 
harboring of a wanted felon and felony theft by receiving/possessing stolen property.  Id.   
                                                          
3  Tyrah Brown’s mother’s last name is “Harding.”  Brown, 155 Idaho at 427, 313 P.3d at 




Brown’s argument that “Detective Long’s implied threats of prosecution or harm 
to Tyra were unjustified[,]” and (similarly) that his “implied threats of consequences to 
Tyrah were unfounded and unsupported at the time” (Appellant’s Brief, p.14), are 
disproven by the facts.  From May 22, 2007 until January 9, 2009 – over 19 months – 
Tyrah faced the charge of first degree murder for killing Mr. Breaw.  Even assuming, 
arguendo, that during his March 22, 2007 interview with Brown, Detective Long 
impliedly or expressly stated that Tyrah was going to be arrested and/or charged for the 
murder of Mr. Breaw, he was absolutely correct.  It would have been disingenuous for 
the detective to suggest otherwise considering Tyrah confessed to the crime, admittedly 
forged the $50,000 escrow check to Mr. Breaw, and fled with her husband to Florida.   
In sum, Brown’s claim that his confession was coerced by false threats about 
placing Tyrah in harm’s way or legal jeopardy is untenable, and should be rejected on 
the same basis cited by the district court --  “The threat, express or implied, that she 
would be arrested was legitimate and was in good faith.  She was arrested and 
prosecuted.”  (R., p.135 (emphasis added).)  See Schumacher, 136 Idaho at 517, 37 
P.3d at 14; United States v. Kolodziej, 706 F.2d 590, 594-595 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(“Involuntariness is present if there are threats or promises of illegitimate action,” but 
statements that if parents were arrested, officers would have to place the children with 
welfare authorities were true); State v. Bopp, 519 P.2d 1277, 1280-1281 (Or. App. 
1974) (“the threat to arrest [the girlfriend] was not constitutionally objectionable coercion 
because the officers threatened ‘only to do what the law permits them to do.’”).   
On appeal, Brown also points to several concerns about Tyrah that he mentioned 




being, . . . past struggles with drug abuse and suicide attempts.”  (Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.11-12.)  Brown argues that, having heard, but not believed, Tyrah’s confession on 
March 21st, the detective “manipulated Mr. Brown’s relationship with his wife” in the next 
day’s interview by “justifying” Brown’s (presumed) actions “as simply protecting his 
wife[,]” who had (according to Tyrah) been raped by Mr. Breaw.  (Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.12-13.)    
First, Detective Long’s subjective belief about whether Tyrah’s confession was 
truthful is not relevant to whether the detective could have truthfully (or in good faith) 
told Brown that she could be arrested and/or charged with killing Mr. Breaw.  The 
standard for whether probable cause to arrest exists is an objective one.  “Subjective 
intentions [of the officer] play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment 
analysis.”  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).  See also State v. Julian, 
129 Idaho 133, 136-37, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (1996) (officer’s subjective beliefs 
concerning probable cause determination are immaterial).  Rather, as explained by the 
Idaho Supreme Court, “[r]easonable or probable cause for an arrest exists where the 
officer possesses information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to 
believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested is guilty.”  
State v. Kysar, 116 Idaho 992, 993, 783 P.2d 859, 860 (1989) (citing State v. Alger, 100 
Idaho 675, 603 P.2d 1009 (1979); State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 677 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 
1984)).  Tyrah’s confession, her admitted forgery of the $50,000 escrow check to Mr. 
Breaw, her flight with her husband from Idaho to Florida, and the fact that it was 
unnecessary to prove which spouse actually shot Mr. Breaw to be charged as a 




charge Tyrah for the homicide of Mr. Breaw.  That Tyrah was in fact charged with the 
first degree murder of Mr. Breaw and bound over to district court following a preliminary 
hearing more than validates the good faith and legitimacy of any threat Detective Long 
may have made to Brown that Tyrah could be arrested or charged for murder.      
Next, it was Brown who brought up Tyrah’s past misfortunes during his interviews 
with Detective Long.  Assuming Tyrah had the sympathy inducing problems Brown 
described (five miscarriages, health issues, drug abuse, suicide attempts), they do not 
show that Detective Long’s questions about Brown’s protective role over Tyrah were 
coercive.  A review of Brown’s March 22, 2007 interview shows that Detective Long 
attempted to get Brown to admit that he shot and killed Mr. Breaw because he was 
enraged that Mr. Breaw allegedly raped Tyrah, and Brown was (in his eyes) protecting 
his wife from a rapist.  Detective Long used Mr. Breaw’s alleged rape of Tyrah, as well 
as Brown’s long-term caring for her troubled life, as a way to introduce the “wife 
protection” theory to Brown in and make it more bearable for him to admit to the 
homicide.  In short, Tyrah’s other problems, most of which were introduced during the 
interview by Brown, were either totally irrelevant or negligible in Detective Long’s 
attempt to get Brown to confess to killing Mr. Breaw because he allegedly raped Tyrah.         
Finally, upon review of the videotaped interview of Brown conducted on March 
22, 2007, the state is unable to discern any point where Detective Long informed Brown 
that Tyrah confessed to shooting Mr. Breaw herself, without Brown’s participation.  
Brown’s argument that he was coerced into confessing that he alone killed Mr. Breaw – 
not Brown’s vulnerable wife – is based on a fiction.  Although Tyrah told Detective Long 




Mr. Breaw, the detective was extremely careful to not relay that fact to Brown during his 
March 22nd interview.  Detective Long gave very general responses to Brown’s inquiries 
about what Tyrah told him the day before.  He explained, for example, that Tyrah “gave 
us everything” about the money, the rape, and the murder.4  To the extent Brown’s 
                                                          
4  The following parts of the March 22 interview reflect how careful Detective Long was 
to not disclose to Brown that Tyrah had confessed to killing Mr. Breaw herself: 
 
[Det. Long] The truth of the matter is that we had Tyrah down here 
yesterday.   
[Brown] Oh, okay. 
[Det. Long] She consented to a polygraph. 
[Brown]   Okay. 
[Det. Long]  And, um, she gave up everything. 
[Brown]   What do you mean? 
[Det. Long]   Everything.  You know what I mean. 
[Brown]  No, I don’t know what . . . what you mean. 
 . . . .  
[Det. Long]  You found out that Les had forced himself on her.  . . .  You 
protected her.  And she is with you because you’ve always 
protected her, am I right? 
 . . . .  
 I’m saying this went down because you love your wife.  This 
went down because you protect your wife.  Idaho has it all 
laid out, okay?  We now, we now have Les, we now have 
Les.  He was murdered.  Okay?  We have everything, they 
have everything. 
 . . . .  
 You are a caring husband who defended your wife.  Am I 
wrong?  . . .  She told me she forged the check and you guys 
took all that money and ran.  You did it.  They found Les.  An 
autopsy has been performed.  They know everything that 
happened.  I want you, you need to save yourself.  You need 
to tell me you defended her because he forced himself on 
her.  You defended her.  We know that.  I know that.  Idaho 
knows that.  Tyrah knows that, okay?  It’s out there. 
 . . . .  
[Brown] How, how do I know that . . . that Tyrah told you that? 
 . . . .  
[Det. Long] She was here yesterday. 




“coerced confession” argument relies on his assertion that he confessed to the homicide 
because Detective Long informed him that his vulnerable wife confessed that she alone 
killed Mr. Breaw, his argument fails.  Instead, the taped interview shows Brown believed 
that Tyrah implicated him for the homicide -- not that she accepted sole blame.  (See n. 
4, supra, especially emphasized part (in response to comment that Tyrah “told us the 
truth,” Brown said, “So I’m the one that’s under suspicion of murder.”).)  In sum, Brown’s 
argument fails because it is not supported by the facts he relies upon.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 I said that I spoke to Tyrah and she made it right.  She had 
been all along denying everything and she gave me A to Z 
last night.  She told me soup to nuts everything that 
happened. 
[Brown] Okay. 
[Det. Long] We have Les’s body.  We know it’s a homicide, okay?  The 
problem is what was the homicide, what was the reason 
behind it? 
 . . . .  
 Tell me why the murder occurred.  She already told me.  I 
want to hear the same thing from you.  I’m not making this 
up. 
 . . . .  
 She admitted she forged the check ’cause you guys needed 
to get out of town.  It all fits Keith. 
 . . . . 
 Tyrah already told us the truth.  I want you to tell the truth too 
so it’s there.   . . .  
[Brown] So I’m the one that’s under suspicion of murder . . . 
[Det. Long]  Yes sir. 
[Brown]  Not Ty? 
[Det. Long]  Well, you were both there, I believe. 
[Brown]  Is that what she told you? 
[Det. Long]  I’m not gonna tell you that part until you tell me . . . .  I’ll 
verify it if you tell me, but I’m not, I’m not gonna lead ya. 
 






 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s opinion 
and order denying Brown’s motion to suppress, and affirm his judgment of conviction 
and sentences. 




      /s/ John C. McKinney____________________ 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
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